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CONFIDENTIALITY AND ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE INTERNET 
AGE: HOW TO HANDLE EMPLOYER 
MONITORING OF EMPLOYEE EMAIL 
ANTHONY BIONDO† 
INTRODUCTION 
Attorney-client privilege, one of the oldest privileges for 
confidential communications,1 needs to adapt to the modern 
world.  The privilege plays an important role in the legal system 
by preventing attorneys from being compelled to divulge 
confidential communications between themselves and their 
clients.  This assurance of confidentiality encourages clients to be 
fully open, which is essential to a well-functioning attorney-client 
relationship.2  However, clients may find that communication is 
unprivileged because they communicated with their attorney 
through a system operated and monitored by their employer.  
Many employers now provide employees with technology 
systems—such as computers and email systems—and many 
employers monitor the communications made through these 
systems.3  Since privilege will not attach to a communication that 
is revealed to a third party,4 some courts have held that when an 
employee uses a monitored email system to communicate with 
 
† Senior Staff, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2016, St. John’s University School of 
Law; B.S., 2013, Computer Science, Stony Brook University. 
1 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS 
AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 3193–94 (1904). 
2 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 3196. 
3 In a 2007 survey of employers, it was found that 43% of companies surveyed 
monitored employee email, and of those, 40% assigned an individual to manually 
read and review email while 73% used technology tools to automatically monitor 
email. 2007 Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance Survey,  
AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION AND THE EPOLICY INSTITUTE, 
http://www.plattgroupllc.com/jun08/2007ElectronicMonitoringSurveillance 
Survey.pdf [hereinafter ePolicy Survey]. 
4 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2285, at 3185. 
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his attorney, the communication is unprivileged.5  This Note 
focuses on email, as it is a common method of electronic 
communication that is often facilitated by employer-controlled 
systems.6 
New technology and new methods of communication have 
created issues in the application of attorney-client privilege.7  In 
particular, the fact that email systems are often facilitated and 
monitored by a third party,8 often an employer,9 creates 
uncertainty in the application of the confidentiality element of 
attorney-client privilege.10  Further compounding the issue are 
employer policies that prohibit personal use or allow for broad 
monitoring of employer systems, which are often buried away 
deep in an employee handbook, and employees may not realize 
that such a policy exists or fully understand the ramifications of 
the policy on the confidentiality of their communications.11  This 
false sense of security can lead to an inadvertent loss of privilege 
by a client.12 
In considering whether an employer has the ability to access 
an electronic communication, courts are attempting to look 
beyond the transaction as experienced by the users, and probe 
 
5 See, e.g., Long v. Marubeni Am. Corp., No. 05Civ.639(GEL)(KNF), 2006 WL 
2998671, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2006) (holding that employer’s policy of prohibiting 
any personal use of company-issued computers removed any possible expectation of 
privacy and that communication was unprivileged since employee used a private 
email account to communicate with attorney on a company-issued computer). 
6 See ePolicy Survey, supra note 3. 
7 JEROME G. SNIDER & HOWARD A. ELLINS, CORPORATE PRIVILEGES AND 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION § 2.08 (1999) (“[M]any important issues currently at 
the center of the privilege discussion concern new technology.”). 
8 See infra Section III.B. 
9 See ePolicy Survey, supra note 3. 
10 SNIDER & ELLINS, supra note 7, § 2.08 (“Using new technology can raise 
concerns about whether purportedly privileged communications were actually made 
in confidence, or whether the use of certain technologies effectuates a waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege.”). 
11 See ePolicy Survey, supra note 3 (“Unfortunately, the methods employers use 
to alert employees to e-mail and Internet monitoring are not necessarily the most 
effective: 70% of organizations in 2007 relied on an employee handbook to inform 
users about computer monitoring.”). Additionally, employees may be mistaken in 
thinking that the employer’s policy does not cover their actions. See, e.g., Long v. 
Marubeni Am. Corp., No. 05Civ.639(GEL)(KNF), 2006 WL 2998671, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 19, 2006) (holding that employees lost privilege by using a company-issued 
computer to access a password protected private email account). 
12 See, e.g., Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1107 (W.D. 
Wash. 2011) (holding that an employee lost privilege despite claim that he never 
received or read the employee handbook). 
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into the path of the message as it flows through the Internet.13  
However, employers are only one of a number of parties that 
facilitate electronic communications with the technical ability 
and limited legal right to intercept and monitor them.14  Though 
an employer may have a comparatively broad right to monitor 
the emails flowing through its systems, they are not the only 
party with a qualified right to do so.15  This Note argues that 
courts should focus on the communication as experienced by the 
user/client.  The policy of encouraging free and open discourse 
and candor favors protecting the client’s reasonable expectations.  
Since electronic communication on the Internet is often 
facilitated by numerous third parties, it is unreasonable to expect 
a client to consider the monitoring ability of each third party 
when communicating with his attorney electronically. 
In confronting the issue of whether an employer-monitored 
electronic communication is privileged, courts will divide the 
confidentiality problem into a two-step inquiry:  (1) Was there a 
subjective expectation of privacy on the part of the 
client/employee, and (2) Was that subjective expectation of 
privacy objectively reasonable?16  As to the first question, clients 
who did not subjectively believe that their communications would 
be confidential are not entitled to the protection of attorney-client 
privilege, because there was no need of an assurance of 
confidentiality to encourage them to make the communication.17  
 
13 See discussion infra Part II (discussing different approaches taken by courts 
in approaching the issue); Section III.B (discussing the issue of perspectives in the 
legal analysis of internet activities). 
14 See discussion infra Section III.A (discussing the rights of Internet Service 
Providers and Internet Mailbox Providers to access communications facilitated 
through their systems). 
15 See discussion infra Section III.A. New York, for example, has a statute 
preventing an electronic communication from losing its privileged character because 
a third-party facilitator may have access to it. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4548 (McKinney 
2016). However, at least one court has held this statute inapplicable to employer 
monitoring. Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2007) (discussed infra). 
16 United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[A]ll claims of 
privilege arising out of the attorney-client relationship . . . require[] a showing that 
the communication in question was given in confidence and that the client 
reasonably understood it to be so given.”). 
17 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2311, at 3234 (“One of the circumstances, by 
which it is commonly apparent that the communication is not confidential, is the 
presence of a third person . . . . [E]ven if we might predicate a desire for confidence by 
the client, the policy of the privilege would still not protect him, because it goes no 
further than is necessary to secure the client’s subjective freedom of 
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As to the second question, however, courts diverge and conflict 
arises.18  Some courts formalistically conclude that if the 
employer has the right to monitor the use of its systems, the 
expectation of privacy is so eroded as to be objectively 
unreasonable, and refuse to apply privilege.19  Though the bright-
line nature of this rule seemingly provides certainty, the rule 
may actually inject more uncertainty into the analysis by forcing 
clients to consider the rights of numerous third parties 
facilitating an electronic communication.20  Other courts have 
adopted one of several factor tests, such as the “oft-quoted”21 four-
factor test from the case In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd.22  These 
tests provide a case-by-case analysis in order to prevent 
communications from inequitably being unprivileged,23 but the 
factors are not sufficiently tied to the reality of communication on 
the Internet or to a user’s reasonable perspective of Internet 
email communication.24 
This Note argues for the use of an objective element that 
focuses on the experience from the perspective of the user.  The 
subjective element of the analysis remains unchanged, but a 
court will be asked to consider whether the client’s subjective 
belief was objectively reasonable from their perspective as a user 
 
consultation . . . .”); see also United States v. Rigas, 281 F. Supp. 2d 733, 737 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“As a general rule, the voluntary production of a privileged 
document waives any claim of privilege with respect to that document.”). 
18 Indeed, when analyzing the particular, many courts take for granted that the 
employee subjectively believed that his communication would be private. See, e.g., In 
re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 258 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he Court 
assumes that the Insider E-mails are otherwise privileged, and further, that the 
Insiders subjectively intended that they be confidential.”). 
19 See, e.g., Long v. Marubeni Am. Corp., No. 05Civ.639(GEL)(KNF), 2006 WL 
2998671, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2006) (holding that employees had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy when employer policy stated that employees “have no right of 
personal privacy” when using employer systems); Scott, 847 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (finding 
no expectation of privacy where employer acknowledged that it did not monitor 
employee email but retained the right to do so). 
20 See infra Section III.B. 
21 Goldstein v. Colborne Acquisition Co., LLC, 873 F. Supp. 2d 932, 935 (N.D. 
Ill. 2012). 
22 322 B.R. at 257. 
23 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981) (“[T]he recognition 
of a privilege based on a confidential relationship . . . should be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1277 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059)). 
24 See id. at 393 (“An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain 
but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no 
privilege at all.”). 
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of the Internet.  This test avoids the issue of requiring clients to 
consider the path their electronic communication takes through 
the Internet by focusing on their perspective as a user of the 
Internet.  Given the seemingly private nature of email, this 
analysis starts with a strong presumption that an email message 
is privileged.  Next, for each party that has a right to access the 
email message as it flows through the Internet, the court 
considers the relationship as between the client and the party 
with access from the client’s perspective as an Internet user.  The 
court asks what the nature of this relationship is, how 
foreseeable it is that the communication may be of interest to 
this party, and whether the party regularly exercises its right to 
monitor the email such that the client should expect that the 
message would be monitored.  This approach has the effect of 
limiting the analysis to the perspective of the user, who is 
entirely unaware of some parties—like operators of routers on 
the Internet—and well aware of others—like an employer or 
email provider—for transparent parties, monitoring is entirely 
unforeseeable and thus privilege is not affected. 
This Note proceeds in four parts.  Part I provides an 
overview of the attorney-client privilege with a focus on the 
history and policy behind the confidentiality requirement.  Part 
II explores the differing approaches, and their respective 
applications, currently used by courts to determine when 
privilege attaches to an attorney-client communication 
transmitted through or using an employer’s systems.  Part III 
provides a background of the relevant technology and discuss the 
different viewpoints courts can take when analyzing an electronic 
communication.  Part IV proposes a new objective analysis of the 
reasonableness of a client’s subjective belief of privacy that 
focuses on the communication from the perspective of the user, 
rather than the perspective of an outsider viewing the Internet 
as a series of physical connections. 
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
Professor John Henry Wigmore explained the concept of 
attorney-client privilege in his well-known treatise Evidence in 
Trials at Common Law: 
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a 
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the 
communications relevant to that purpose, (4) made in 
FINAL_BIONDO 10/25/2016  8:55 AM 
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confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently 
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, 
(8) except the client waives the protection.25 
This Part examines the privilege by dividing these elements 
into three components.  The first component defines the subject 
matter covered by the privilege, legal advice sought from a 
professional legal advisor.  The second component defines the 
type of material covered, communications between a client and 
an attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.  The third 
component covers how an act, inconsistent with the intent for a 
communication to be or remain confidential, affects privilege. 
A. Component One: Legal Advice Is Sought from a Professional 
Legal Advisor in His or Her Capacity as Such 
The first component is that legal advice is sought from a 
professional legal advisor in his or her capacity as such.  This 
component defines the scope of the subject matter to which 
privilege may be applied.26  It is the intent of the client that 
controls.27  The client must intend to obtain legal advice or 
assistance in order for privilege to attach.28  The privilege, 
however, is quite broad; notably, there is no limitation that either 
litigation or a specific dispute be contemplated or underway at 
the time of the consultation.29 
 
25 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2292, at 3204. This formulation has received 
substantial deference in the courts. See, e.g., United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 
1441 (4th Cir. 1986) (considering the Wigmore formulation); see also, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) 
(providing only four elements); Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding 
Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 853–55 n.1 (1998) 
(collecting statutes). 
26 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 2294–2304, at 3206–23. 
27 1 PAUL R. RICE ET AL., ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE U.S. § 7:1 (2015) 
[hereinafter PRIVILEGE]. 
28 Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 843 F.2d 652, 657 (2d Cir. 1988) (“The 
key . . . is the intent of the client and whether he reasonably understood the 
conference to be confidential.”); United States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630, 640 (9th Cir. 
1980) (holding that attorney hired by a counterfeiter to purchase printing equipment 
for him “was acting as a business agent rather than a legal adviser” such that 
privilege could not attach). 
29 PRIVILEGE, supra note 27, § 7:1; see, e.g., In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938 n.8 
(8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the “prepared in anticipation of litigation” standard 
applicable to attorney work product protection was not necessary in order for 
attorney-client privilege to attach). 
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This demonstrates the primary modern justification for the 
attorney-client privilege, which is to free the client from 
apprehension and encourage full and frank disclosure when the 
client seeks legal advice from his attorney.30  It stems from a 
recognition that in order for lawyers to give sound legal advice 
and provide strong advocacy, the lawyer must be fully informed 
by the client.31  However, any privilege enforced by the court is 
an exception to the general rule that every person can be called 
upon to give testimony upon all facts.32  This component helps to 
balance the competing policy interest in the efficient 
administration of justice against the policy of promoting client 
candor.33  It helps to narrowly tailor the privilege to only protect 
those disclosures that are “necessary to obtain informed legal 
advice which might not have been made absent the privilege.”34 
B. Component Two: A Communication Has Been Made by the 
Client Relating to the Purpose of Seeking Legal Advice 
The second component is that the privilege covers a 
communication made by the client relating to the purpose of 
seeking legal advice.  This component defines what type of 
material is covered.  It is only a communication between the 
attorney and the client that is protected by the privilege.35  The 
facts communicated are not covered by the privilege, only the 
contents of the communication itself.36  Facts and information do 
 
30 See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 3196–97; Upjohn Co. v. United 
States., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“Its purpose is to encourage full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader 
public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”). 
31 Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389 (“The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice 
or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the 
lawyer's being fully informed by the client.”). 
32 See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2285, at 3185 (“[T]he principle of Privilege, as 
an exception to the general liability of every person to give testimony to all facts 
inquired of in a court of justice . . . .”). 
33 Id. § 2295, at 3211 (discussing the policy of the requirement). 
34 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). 
35 See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 395 (“The privilege only protects disclosure of 
communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who 
communicated with the attorney.”); PRIVILEGE, supra note 27, at § 5:1 (“An 
important but commonly misunderstood limitation of the privilege is that it does not 
protect the information contained within communications to the attorney.”). 
36 See, e.g., In re Six Grand Jury Witnesses, 979 F.2d 939, 943–44 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(stating that the court was still able to compel employees to reveal their analyses of 
certain costs as these were the underlying facts in the case, it did not matter that 
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not become privileged simply because they have been 
communicated by a client to his or her attorney.37  For example, if 
a client has communicated with his attorney facts about a 
particular event, he cannot be compelled to answer questions of 
the form “what did you tell your attorney about the event,” but 
could still be compelled to answer factual questions about the 
event itself.38  Like the first component, this component also 
helps to narrowly tailor the privilege.  It protects the rights of the 
adversary and the fact finder by allowing them to learn the facts 
of the case, while promoting client candor by preventing 
disclosure of communications made while seeking legal advice.39 
C. Component Three: The Communication Was Made in 
Confidence and the Confidence of the Communication Has 
Been Maintained 
The third component is that the communication has been 
made in confidence and that the confidence be maintained.  This 
component defines the effect of an action inconsistent with the 
intent of a communication to be privileged.  In order for privilege 
to attach, the client must have reasonably intended for the 
communication to be made in confidence.40  This is a two-part 
analysis.  First, the client must subjectively intend that the 
communication with his attorney be confidential.41  Second, this 
subjective intent must be objectively reasonable under the  
 
 
 
 
they had performed an analysis of costs at the request of counsel and communicated 
this analysis to counsel). 
37 See id. at 944 (“[M]erely by asking witnesses to conduct an analysis defense 
counsel may not thereby silence all the key witnesses on the cost aspects of the 
[subject] contracts under [a] claim of privilege.”). 
38 See PRIVILEGE, supra note 27, at § 5:1. 
39 See, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403 (“However, since the privilege has the effect 
of withholding relevant information from the fact-finder, it applies only where 
necessary to achieve its purpose.”). 
40 See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[A]ll 
claims of privilege arising out of the attorney-client relationship . . . require[] a 
showing that the communication in question was given in confidence and that the 
client reasonably understood it to be so given.”). 
41 PRIVILEGE, supra note 27, at § 6:1 (“The client must intend his 
communications with his attorney to be confidential.”). 
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circumstances.42  Finally, this confidence must then be 
maintained in order for the communication to remain privileged; 
otherwise, privilege is waived.43 
The argument for the confidentiality requirement is based in 
policy.  In seeking to protect only those disclosures that are 
“necessary to obtain informed legal advice which might not have 
been made absent the privilege,”44 if the client is willing to make 
a disclosure in the presence of a third party, then the client does 
not need the encouragement of privilege protection in order to 
make the disclosure.45  Professor John Henry Wigmore views 
confidentiality as an essential component of the relationship 
between the two parties—it makes the communication worth 
protecting because a legal assurance of nondisclosure cannot aid 
a relationship where confidentiality is neither present nor 
expected.46  If confidentiality is not essential to the relationship, 
he argues, then any assurances of confidentiality through the 
application of privilege do not sufficiently aid the relationship—
and, conversely, the lack of a privilege does not harm it—and the 
costs of providing such protection outweigh the benefits.47 
This logic is not without criticism.48  Professor Paul R. Rice 
argues that this argument “equates secrecy with safety.”49  Rice 
defines “safety” as the risk that a communication will be used 
against the client, whereas secrecy is the risk that it will simply 
be disclosed to a third party.50  Rice argues that the exclusionary 
effect of the privilege is what is fundamental to the candor and to 
the preservation of the relationship, and not any assurance of 
 
42 Id. (“The client’s subjective intention of confidentiality must be reasonable 
under the circumstances.”). 
43 Id. (“[T]he confidentiality must have been subsequently maintained.”). 
44 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403. 
45 See, e.g., 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2311, at 3233 (citation omitted) (“The 
reason for prohibiting disclosure ceases when the client does not appear to have been 
desirous of secrecy.”). 
46 Id. § 2285, at 3185 (“This element of confidentiality must be essential to the 
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.”). 
47 Id. (“The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the 
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct 
disposal of litigation.”). 
48 See Rice, supra note 25, at 859 (arguing that the confidentiality requirement 
should be abolished in its entirety). 
49 Id. at 859–60 (“[I]t assumes that a client who is not concerned with public 
embarrassment is also unconcerned about being legally compromised by the use of 
these communications.”). 
50 Id. 
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absolute secrecy of the communications.51  Secrecy is within the 
control of the client, since the attorney has a professional 
responsibility to maintain secrecy and it is within the client’s 
power to insist upon secrecy.52  Rice argues that requiring 
secrecy, which the client can already insist upon if it is indeed 
essential to the relationship, does not further the relationship, 
and that the costs of maintaining the confidentiality requirement 
outweigh the speculative benefits of narrowly tailoring the 
privilege.53 
Since rigid adherence to the requirement of confidentiality 
may result in inequities, for example, when the parties are 
unaware of a third party monitoring their communication, some 
courts have begun to look at the issue through waiver doctrine.54  
This analysis is focused on the voluntary acts of the client that 
are inconsistent with the existence of a privilege.55  It views the 
waiver—or failure of privilege to attach—as the product of a 
“voluntary relinquishment of the attorney-client privilege.”56  
This view of the confidentiality requirement has the effect of 
introducing exceptions to the rule, such as the inadvertent 
disclosure exception.57  The inadvertent disclosure exception, 
formally recognized in the Federal Rules of Evidence,58 protects 
clients from inadvertent waiver when they have involuntarily or 
 
51 Id. at 860. 
52 Id. (“While secrecy often may be desired by the client, it is ensured, in part, 
through the attorney by the Code of Professional Responsibility, and otherwise 
within the factual control of the client.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client . . . .”). 
53 Rice, supra note 25, at 860–61. 
54 Id. at 881 (“Some courts began applying the standard for waiver . . . .”); 
United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he person invoking the 
privilege must have taken steps to ensure that it was not waived . . . .”). 
55 SNIDER & ELLINS, supra note 7, at § 2.06 (“Courts have categorized the 
various acts and events that will create a waiver as voluntary or express and as 
unintentional or implied. . . . [Thus, courts] consider waiver in terms of the act that 
led to the disclosure.”). 
56 Rice, supra note 25, at 881 n.76 (quoting State v. Beaupre, 459 A.2d 233, 236 
(N.H. 1983)); see, e.g., Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 788 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(requiring waiver of attorney-client privilege to be knowing). 
57 Rice, supra note 25, at 881 (“As courts moved away from requiring 
confidentiality as an absolute prerequisite for the existence of the privilege . . . a 
number of new waiver concepts emerged.”). 
58 FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(1). 
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mistakenly revealed the communication.59  With new electronic 
communications that are often facilitated and transparently 
monitored by third parties, inadvertent disclosure of a 
communication is more likely than ever.  Given complex nature 
of the Internet as a system of ferrying messages via multiple 
third-party computer systems, true confidentiality is rarely, if 
ever, assured.60  If uncertainty in the true confidentiality of an 
email is allowed to translate into uncertainty in the application 
of a privilege, the privilege will be ineffective in encouraging the 
candor required to protect the attorney-client relationship.  
Principles of waiver, a concern for safety over absolute privacy, 
and taking the perspective of a user rather than of an external 
viewer will help inject a much-needed element of certainty into 
the privilege as applied in complicated environments such as the 
Internet. 
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TAKEN BY COURTS 
Currently, courts take two different approaches when 
confronted with an issue involving an employee communicating 
with his attorney through an employer system.61  Once the other 
elements of attorney-client privilege have been met, and it has 
been shown that there was a subjective belief on the part of the 
client that the communication was private, the narrow question 
becomes the objective reasonableness of the client’s subjective 
belief.62  This is where the two approaches diverge.  Section II.A 
addresses the use of factor tests, particularly the oft-quoted four-
factor test from In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd.63  Section II.B  
 
 
 
59 Rule 502(b) provides for protection from waiver when: “(1) the disclosure is 
inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to 
prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the 
error . . . .” FED. R. EVID. 502(b). However, courts have treated “mistakenly, albeit 
voluntarily, made” disclosures inconsistently. PRIVILEGE, supra note 27, at § 9:72. 
60 See infra Sections III.A, III.B. 
61 Compare In re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (providing a four-factor test), with Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. Inc., 847 
N.Y.S.2d 436, 440 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (focusing on confidentiality). 
62 See, e.g., In Re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. at 255 (emphasis omitted) 
(“Confidentiality has both a subjective and objective component; the communication 
must be given in confidence, and the client must reasonably understand it to be so 
given.” (citing United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 1989))). 
63 322 B.R. at 257. 
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addresses the use of a more formalistic approach in which courts 
still consider various factors but place a strong emphasis on 
actual confidentiality. 
A. Four-Factor Test 
Courts considering the issue commonly cite the four-factor 
test from In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd.64  In that case, the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New 
York addressed the issue when a debtor vacated its offices and 
left allegedly privileged emails behind on the debtor’s servers.65  
The Trustee began an investigation involving the officers of the 
debtor who had sent the emails, and served a subpoena duces 
tecum on the officers seeking the production of the emails.66  The 
debtor asserted privilege, which the debtors opposed because the 
messages were not communicated confidentially due to the use of 
a corporate email system.67  Based on right-to-privacy in the 
workplace cases under the Fourth Amendment, the court 
identified four factors that should be considered in determining 
whether a belief in privacy was objectively reasonable: 
(1) does the corporation maintain a policy banning personal or 
other objectionable use, (2) does the company monitor the use of 
the employee’s computer or e-mail, (3) do third parties have a 
right of access to the computer or e-mails, and (4) did the 
corporation notify the employee, or was the employee aware, of 
the use and monitoring policies?68 
The court then noted that the employer “clearly had access to its 
own servers” where the emails were stored, that it had a policy of 
banning personal use of the email system, and that it notified 
employees of this policy.69  However, the court was equivocal as to 
whether or not the employer had a policy of actually monitoring 
email and refused to conclude that privilege had been waived as 
a matter of law.70 
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 252. 
66 Id. at 252–53. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 257 (footnote omitted). 
69 Id. at 259. 
70 Id. at 260–61. 
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Many courts have since looked to these factors for 
“advisory”71 guidance on how to determine the objective 
reasonableness of a client’s expectation of confidentiality.72  In 
United States v. Hatfield, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York considered the factors when a 
criminal defendant asserted privilege for several documents that 
were otherwise privileged but had been stored on the hard drive 
of an employer-provided computer.73 
As to the first factor—the existence of a computer use 
policy—the court noted that the employer’s policy did not 
explicitly prohibit personal usage, though it did explicitly 
prohibit some behavior, such as sexual harassment, installing 
pirated software, and sending junk mail.74  The court thus 
reasoned that this silence favored privilege.75  As to the second 
factor—a monitoring policy—the court noted that the employer’s 
policy allowed for the right to monitor, but that it did not 
explicitly say that the company would monitor employee system 
use; this, too, tipped in favor of applying privilege.76  As to the 
third factor—a right of access—the court once again noted that 
the employer had reserved a right of access and that this factor 
tipped in favor of nonprivilege.77  As to the fourth factor—proper 
notice of the monitoring policy—the court noted that the 
defendant had notice of the policy and that this factor tipped in 
favor of privilege.78 
As a tiebreaker,79 the court added a fifth factor: how the 
employer interpreted its own computer usage policy.80  The court 
pointed to evidence that “unambiguously shows that [the 
employer] believed that employees did not forfeit applicable 
 
71 See, e.g., United States v. Finazzo, No. 10-CR-457 (RRM)(RML), 2013 WL 
619572, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013) (“[T]he test is only advisory.”); United States 
v. Hatfield, No. 06-CR-0550 (JS), 2009 WL 3806300, at *8 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 
2009) (“[T]he [c]ourt construes [the test] as being strictly advisory.”). 
72 See, e.g., Finazzo, 2013 WL 619572, at *7; Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, Civil 
Action No. 5:10-0906, 2011 WL 5201430, at *5–6 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 31, 2011); 
Hatfield, 2009 WL 3806300, at *8 n.13; Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. Inc., 847 
N.Y.S.2d 436, 441–42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007). 
73 Hatfield, 2009 WL 3806300, at *1. 
74 Id. at *9. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at *10 (noting that this fifth factor was “ultimately [the] deciding factor”). 
80 Id. 
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privileges by maintaining personal legal documents on their 
company computers.”81  Indeed, the employer’s own counsel 
testified that he believed individual privilege was protected 
under the policy.82  Accordingly, the court reasoned that the 
government, in arguing in favor of nonprivilege, was trying to 
impose an interpretation of the usage policy that was never 
imagined by the employer itself.83  The court finally held that the 
communication was privileged.84 
Courts do not, in every case where they apply the four-factor 
test, hold that privilege may be applied.  In In re Royce Homes, 
LP,85 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of Texas reached the opposite conclusion after applying 
the four-factor test.86  There, an employee used a computer owned 
by the debtor to draft and send email messages, and the Trustee 
appointed to administer the debtor’s estate sought production of 
the messages to determine if the debtor made any transfers.87  
Adopting the four-factor test,88 the court compelled disclosure of 
the messages.89  The court noted that the employer had a policy 
allowing for access and monitoring of employer systems and 
prohibiting certain uses of employer systems, and that all 
information on the systems belonged to the company and would 
not be considered private.90  Finally, the court concluded that the 
employee knew or should have known of this policy, and that he 
offered no evidence to rebut the assumption that he did, 
ultimately compelling disclosure of the documents.91 
This test, however, appears to place an undue emphasis on 
the draftsman’s art, as courts applying the test tend to focus on 
the wording of the employer’s policy reserving the right to inspect 
employee communications.  All four of the Asia Global factors 
focus on the employer’s policies,92 while only the fifth “tiebreaker 
element” from Hatfield introduces an element far more likely to 
 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 449 B.R. 709 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011). 
86 Id. at 737–38. 
87 Id. at 732–33. 
88 Id. at 737–38. 
89 Id. at 732. 
90 Id. at 738. 
91 Id. at 732. 
92 See In re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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be on an employee’s mind when considering the confidentiality of 
a communication: how the policy is actually enforced by the 
employer.93  In focusing on a policy that may or may not be 
enforced, this test leads to inconsistent applications of the 
privilege, harming the attorney-client relationship. 
B. Formalistic Approach: Focusing on Confidentiality-in-Fact 
Some courts take a more formalistic approach to the issue.  
These courts place an emphasis on confidentiality-in-fact, 
reasoning that if the communication was available at the time of 
communication to a third party—the employer—privilege cannot 
attach.94  In Hatfield, the court noted that most courts, after 
applying the four-factor test, have held that employees may still 
assert privilege on a communication made using an employer 
system.95  Some cases, such as Long v. Marubeni America Corp.96 
and Scott v. Beth Israel Medical Center Inc.,97 purport to be 
applying the four-factor test, but in reality seem to be taking a 
more formalistic approach to the issue.98  These cases actually 
place a substantial emphasis on actual confidentiality, or the lack 
thereof, and thus may properly be categorized as applying a 
formalistic test.  These two cases will be considered in this 
subpart. 
In Long v. Marubeni America Corp.,99 the plaintiff asserted 
privilege for several email messages sent through private 
password protected third party mailbox accounts using 
computers provided by his employer, the defendant.100  The 
employer had obtained these messages through monitoring 
 
93 See United States v. Hatfield, No 06-CR-0550 (JS), 2009 WL 3806300, at *10 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009). 
94 See, e.g., Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 2007). 
95 Hatfield, 2009 WL 3806300, at *8 (“[M]ost-but not all-courts have held that 
employees do not waive privilege simply by maintaining documents on a company 
computer system.”). 
96 No. 05Civ.639(GEL)(KNF), 2006 WL 2998671 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
97 847 N.Y.S.2d 436. 
98 Compare Hatfield, 2009 WL 3806300, at *8 (noting that these both apply a 
factor test), with Alex DeLisi, Note, Employer Monitoring of Employee Email: 
Attorney-Client Privilege Should Attach to Communications That the Client Believed 
Were Confidential, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3521, 3551 (2013) (categorizing both Long 
and Scott as applying a formalistic test). 
99 2006 WL 2998671. 
100 Id. at *2. 
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software installed on the computer.101  The court did not 
reference the four-factor test explicitly, but did consider all four 
factors, noting that use of the system for personal matters was 
prohibited, that the employer’s policy said that employees have 
no right of privacy on employer systems, that the employer had 
the right to monitor the systems, and that the plaintiff knew or 
should have known of the policy.102  The court, however, focused 
on the principle of waiver: that the plaintiff knew of the policy 
and continued anyway, and that the confidentiality of the 
documents was in fact compromised as a result, and held that the 
emails were not privileged.103 
In Scott v. Beth Israel Medical Center Inc.,104 a New York 
trial court held that privilege did not attach when an employee 
communicated with his attorney through his employer’s email 
system.105  First, the court rejected the proposition that waiver 
was prevented by New York C.P.L.R. 4548, which preserves 
privilege when parties necessary for the facilitation of an 
electronic communication have access to the communication.106  
The court then turned to the four-factor test, and considered the 
effect of the employee handbook on privilege.107  Rather than 
holding that the expectation of privacy was unreasonable, the 
court simply held that “the effect of [the policy] is to have the 
employer looking over your shoulder each time you send an 
email,” concluding that the communication was not made in 
confidence and that the communications was not privileged.108 
In focusing on actual confidentiality, these courts, while they 
purport to be applying a factor test, are actually taking a far 
more formalistic approach to this issue.  The courts in these cases 
are formalistically concluding that a lack of confidentiality 
precludes the application of privilege.  While this does inject an 
element of certainty into the equation, it is easy to see how this  
 
 
101 Id. at *1. 
102 Id. at *3. 
103 Id. (“The plaintiffs disregarded the admonishment voluntarily and, as a 
consequence, have stripped from the e-mail messages referenced above the 
confidential cloak with which they claim those communications were covered.”). 
104 847 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007). 
105 Id. at 447. 
106 Id. at 440. 
107 Id. at 441. 
108 Id. at 440. 
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would result in some communications being unexpectedly 
unprivileged, as it weighs heavily in favor of the communication 
not being privileged. 
III. CONFIDENTIALITY, TECHNOLOGY, AND PERSPECTIVES 
Section III.A provides a background of the legal protections 
provided to protect email from interception and monitoring 
through the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”).109  
Section III.B provides an overview of the different viewpoints one 
could take when analyzing an electronic communication, along 
with a background of the relevant technology. 
A. Legal Protections of Electronic Communications 
The legal protections afforded to email are similar to those 
afforded to other forms of communication.  Both email providers 
and Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) are restricted in what 
they can monitor by the ECPA.110  The ECPA consists of two 
parts:  The Wiretap Act,111 which governs the interception of 
electronic communications, and the Stored Communications 
Act,112 which governs unauthorized access to stored electronic 
information.113  The actual scope of the ECPA in protecting email 
is the subject of much debate beyond the scope of this Note.114  
This subsection considers briefly the implications of the ECPA 
and its exceptions on the following three parties: ISPs, Internet 
mailbox providers, and employers providing mailboxes and 
equipment. 
 
109 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 
Stat. 1848. 
110 Id. 
111 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012). 
112 Id. §§ 2701–2712. 
113 See Ariana R. Levinson, Toward a Cohesive Interpretation of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act for the Electronic Monitoring of Employees, 114 W. VA. 
L. REV. 461, 485 (2012). 
114 See id. (discussing the debate about the scope of the ECPA and how it 
impacts employer monitoring of employee communications); Miguel Helft & Claire 
Cain Miller, 1986 Privacy Law Is Outrun by the Web, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2011), 
http://nyti.ms/1HH6nw6; Rainey Reitman, Deep Dive: Updating the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Dec. 6, 2012), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/12/deep-dive-updating-electronic-
communications-privacy-act (arguing for a modification of the law to account for 
modern technology). 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
recently addressed the rights of ISPs in Kirch v. Embarq 
Management Co.115  In that case, customers filed an action 
alleging interception under the ECPA when the defendant, their 
ISP, authorized an online advertising company to conduct a test 
for directing and targeting advertisements to users that involved 
directing traffic through the advertising company’s servers.116  
Since the definition of “interception” in the ECPA does not 
include the contents of communication “acquired in the ordinary 
course of business,” the court held that the ISP had not actually 
intercepted any communications and therefore did not violate the 
ECPA.117  Advertising, the court reasoned, was a legitimate 
business purpose for collecting and analyzing the information.118 
Next, we consider the rights of Internet mailbox providers.  
Google’s privacy policy has been the subject of recent litigation, 
including two conflicting decisions.  In In re Google, Inc. Privacy 
Policy Litigation,119  Magistrate Judge Grewal for the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California120 
held that the definition of “interception” in the Wiretap Act 
similarly did not include Google acting as a service provider 
when it obtained and used the information “in the ordinary 
course of its business.”121  The court broadly interpreted the 
phrase “ordinary course of business” to include Google’s “core 
targeted advertising” business.122  As to the Stored 
Communications Act, the court said that the claim “borders on 
frivolous,” and explained that the Act exempts conduct 
authorized “by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic 
communications service,” which Google clearly authorized its 
own conduct.123  Additionally, in In re Google Inc. Gmail 
 
115 702 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2012). 
116 Id. at 1245–46. 
117 Id. at 1251 (“Earthlink acquired the contents of electronic communications 
but did so in the ordinary course of business.” (quoting Hall v. Earthlink Network, 
Inc., 396 F.3d 500, 504 (2d Cir. 2005))). 
118 Id. 
119 No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013). 
120 This is Google’s home district. See Google Locations, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/about/company/facts/locations (last visited Aug. 26, 2016) 
(listing Mountain View, CA as company headquarters). 
121 2013 WL 6248499, at *10 (quoting 18 U.S.C § 2510(5)(a) (2012)). 
122 Id. at *10–11 (citing Kirch, 702 F.3d at 1250). 
123 Id. at *12 (quoting 18 U.S.C § 2701(c)(1) (2012)). 
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Litigation,124 the court narrowly interpreted the same phrase in 
the Wiretap Act—the “ordinary course of business”—to only 
include interception that was an “instrumental component of 
Google’s operation of a functioning email system.”125  The court 
did not address the Stored Communications Act.126 
Finally, we consider the rights of employers in monitoring 
employer-operated systems.  In ECPA cases involving employers 
monitoring employee email, courts have applied the same 
exceptions as to other providers and have tended to permit broad 
monitoring.  In Freedom Calls Foundation v. Bukstel,127 the 
plaintiff employer monitored and used the email account of the 
ex-employee defendant—[defendant]@freedomcalls.org—who had 
left the company, founded an identically named organization and 
created himself a similar email address—
[defendant]@freedomcalls.us.128  In the ensuing trademark 
dispute, the defendant counterclaimed based on the ECPA that 
his former employer had no right to access the emails still stored 
in his old mailbox or to continue monitoring it for new emails 
mistakenly sent to the incorrect address.129  The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the 
provider exceptions in both the Wiretap Act and the Stored 
Communications Act applied to protect the plaintiff from these 
claims.130  Since the plaintiff provided the defendant with the 
communication service, the court reasoned, they had the right to 
search those stored emails as the need arose.131  As to the 
Wiretap Act, the court reasoned that the plaintiff was not 
intercepting the emails as it received them in the normal course 
of business and was using them to handle client matters in a 
timely fashion.132 
 
 
124 No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013). 
125 Id. at *8. 
126 Id. 
127 No. 05CV5460(SJ)(VVP), 2006 WL 845509 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2006). 
128 Id. at *2. 
129 Id. at *27. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. (citing Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 
2003)). 
132 Id. 
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Similarly, in Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,133 
the plaintiff sued his ex-employer for damages under the ECPA 
after the defendant employer searched his mailbox on its central 
server for emails indicating his disloyalty, found such emails, and 
terminated Plaintiff’s employment.134  As to the Wiretap Act, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that 
the employer did not “intercept” his communications because it 
obtained the emails at an earlier time and accessed them once 
they were already stored.135  An intercept, the court reasoned, 
had to be contemporaneous with transmission.136  As to the 
Stored Communications Act, just like in Freedom Calls 
Foundation, the court reasoned that the act of accessing email 
authorized by the service provider was excepted from the act, and 
that the employer as a service provider could do as it wished.137 
Clearly, the ECPA provides protection that is uncertain at 
best to employees, email users, and Internet users generally.  It 
can be said that these service providers all have a sort of 
qualified permission to monitor Internet traffic and emails for 
business purposes.  An employer-employee relationship is a 
special case, but an employer’s rights to inspect email are still 
limited in much the same way as that of any other service 
provider. 
B. Perspectives and Technical Background 
When analyzing a legal problem on the Internet, the outcome 
often depends on whether the problem is analyzed from the 
“internal” perspective of a user on the Internet or from the 
“external” perspective of the Internet as a set of physical links 
between various systems spread throughout the globe.138  To the 
internal observer, an email is “the equivalent of old-fashioned 
postal mail,” a user simply drops the message in the mailbox of 
 
133 352 F.3d 107. 
134 Id. at 110–11. 
135 Id. at 113–14. 
136 Id. (citing United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1048–49 (11th Cir. 2003); 
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002); Steve Jackson 
Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 458 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
137 Id. at 114–15. 
138 See Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 
357, 357 (2003) (“The Internet’s facts depend on whether we look to physical reality 
or virtual reality for guidance.”). 
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the recipient.139  To the external observer, this is a far more 
complicated process involving the transmission of a message 
between several third parties to get it to its destination.140  One 
can look at the situation in more and more abstract ways, 
ranging from “0s and 1s” to the simple postal mail analogy.141  
Depending on how abstract a viewpoint one adopts, the question 
of whether a communication is confidential may be answered 
differently. 
For example, a phone conversation, as an objective matter, 
cannot be guaranteed to be private because it is routed through 
wires operated by the phone company—a third party.142  Courts 
are willing to extend privilege to phone conversations, however, 
because of the legal protections afforded to them.143  This is 
taking a more internal perspective—the view of a party on the 
phone as having a private conversation with another, albeit 
facilitated by a third party.  The legal protections afforded to 
modern Internet communications are not as strong.144  In 
deciding problems of privilege based on what parties have access 
to a communication, courts are choosing a perspective whether or 
not they actually recognize that they are doing so.145  If a court 
holds that employer monitoring of a system destroys any 
possibility of privilege, it is implicitly taking an external 
perspective to the issue.  A problem arises when a court takes an 
external perspective as to some aspects, such as employer 
monitoring, but ignores other aspects, such as the facilitation of 
the communications through other third parties such as ISPs. 
 
139 Id. at 365. 
140 Id. at 365–66. 
141 Id. at 361–62 (“This does not necessarily mean that the Internet must be 
viewed only as 0s and 1s . . . . [W]e look for analogies between realspace and the 
behind-the-scenes action that computers connected to the Internet process and 
complete.”). 
142 See David Hricik, Confidentiality & Privilege in High-Tech Communications, 
60 TEX. B.J. 104, 107 (1997) (“[A]s an objective matter, there is no guarantee that 
land-based phone conversations cannot be overheard, misdirected, or intercepted, 
whether lawfully or not.”). 
143 See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2012) (prohibiting the use of unlawfully intercepted 
communications as evidence in most situations, including in state and federal court); 
18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (2012) (creating a civil damage remedy for unlawfully 
intercepted communications); SNIDER & ELLINS, supra note 7, at § 2.08 (“Traditional 
landline telephone conversations are generally treated as confidential.”). 
144 See supra Section III.A. 
145 Kerr, supra note 138, at 381 (“Courts already choose perspectives when they 
apply law to the Internet. They just [do not] realize it.”). 
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An explanation of the technical background illustrates the 
issue.  Information transmitted through the Internet is broken 
up into small “packets” of information,146 each of which is 
independently routed147 through a number of routers148 and then 
reconstructed149 at the other end—multiple copies of parts of a 
message may exist in different places at the same time.150  Since 
each packet of data is considered independently, the packets that 
make up an email are not even guaranteed to take the same path 
through the Internet to their destination.151  The routing of 
Internet traffic is even subject to—likely illegal—manipulation 
from elsewhere in the world.152  Indeed, the actual transmission 
of the packet between routers may be protected under wiretap 
statutes, but the routers in between, which copy and relay the 
data to the next router, operated by ISPs create a privacy 
hazard.153  ISPs can and do intercept, monitor, and even modify 
traffic for a variety of reasons, such as injecting  
 
 
146 JAMES F. KUROSE & KEITH W. ROSS, COMPUTER NETWORKING: A TOP-DOWN 
APPROACH 56 (5th ed. 2010) (“In modern computer networks, the source breaks long 
messages into smaller chunks of data known as packets.”); see also INFO. SCIS. INST., 
INTERNET PROTOCOL 1 (Jon Postel ed., 1981), http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc791.pdf 
[hereinafter RFC 791]. 
147 See RFC 791, supra note 146, at 2 (“The internet protocol treats each 
internet datagram as an independent entity unrelated to any other internet 
datagram.”). 
148 KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 146, at 59 (“When a packet arrives at a router in 
the network, the router examines a portion of the packet’s destination address and 
forwards the packet to an adjacent router.”); see RFC 791, supra note 146, at 7 (“This 
is done by passing the datagrams from one internet module to another until the 
destination is reached.”). 
149 KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 146, at 56; see generally INFO. SCIS. INST., 
TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL (Jon Postel ed., 1981), http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/ 
rfc793.pdf [hereinafter RFC 793]. 
150 Hricik, supra note 142, at 113 (“[M]ultiple copies can exist at any given 
time . . . .”). 
151 RFC 791, supra note 146, at 2. 
152 Such a situation has recently occurred. In what may best be described as a 
heist, a hacker at a Canadian ISP recently managed to redirect “an entire chunk of 
raw internet traffic from more than a dozen internet service providers” through its 
servers, sifting through the data to intercept bitcoins, an electronic currency. See 
Andy Greenberg, Hacker Redirects Traffic from 19 Internet Providers To Steal 
Bitcoins, WIRED (Aug. 7, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/08/isp-bitcoin-
theft. 
153 See, e.g., Test Your ISP, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/test 
yourisp (last visited Aug. 26, 2016). 
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advertisements,154 detecting and inhibiting the use of peer-to-
peer file sharing software,155 or sifting through the content of 
communications to detect copyrighted material.156 
This process applies to every communication on the Internet, 
and email is built atop this system.  An email message is not sent 
directly from one computer to another, but is ferried as packets 
from the sender’s computer to their mail provider, which 
transmits it to the recipient’s mail provider, where it is stored in 
a mailbox awaiting retrieval by the recipient.157  Copies of the 
message likely remain in mailboxes stored on servers controlled 
by both the sender and the recipient’s mail provider.158  The 
copies of these messages are often further monitored and 
analyzed by one’s email provider, be it a commercial provider like 
Google, Microsoft, or the user’s employer.159 
For example, Google, one of the world’s most popular email 
providers,160 has “automated systems [that] analyze [the user’s] 
content (including emails) to provide [the user] personally 
relevant product features, such as . . . tailored advertising.”161  
Google also will share personal information with outside entities 
 
154 See, e.g., Nate Anderson, How a Banner Ad for H&R Block Appeared on 
apple.com—Without Apple’s OK, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 7, 2013, 8:30 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/04/how-a-banner-ad-for-hs-ok (describing 
ISP injection of advertisements). 
155 Milton L. Mueller & Hadi Asghari, Deep Packet Inspection and Bandwidth 
Management: Battles over BitTorrent in Canada and the United States, 36 
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for a number of reasons, such as to “enforce applicable Terms of 
Service, including investigation of potential violations[;] [to] 
detect, prevent, or otherwise address fraud, security or technical 
issues[;] [and to] protect against harm to the rights, property or 
safety of Google, [its] users or the public as required or permitted 
by law.”162  In a recent incident, Microsoft, apparently acting 
under the terms of its own privacy policy,163 accessed the mailbox 
of a Hotmail subscriber as part of an internal investigation of the 
theft of the source code of one of its products.164  Microsoft was 
one of “a number of companies [with] broad terms of service” that 
allow for this action, though it is admittedly “rare that any 
[company] actually follow[s] through and sift[s] through a 
customer’s personal email.”165 
This illustrates the problem with taking an external 
perspective to determine whether email messages are 
confidential—they simply are not.  And yet, it can hardly be said 
that this monitoring actually affects the attorney-client 
relationship.  From an external perspective, most electronic 
communications are not truly private, but the user’s acceptance 
of this type of monitoring would not seem to be inconsistent with 
the user’s expectation of confidentiality and privilege.  Consider 
Professor Rice’s idea of safety over privacy:  An internet user can 
feel safe despite electronic monitoring because the user expects 
that the monitoring has nothing to do with the subject of the 
communication.166  Employer monitoring is, of course, more 
invasive than the use of an automated system by Google to pick 
which ads to display—it is the nature of the relationship between 
the client and his employer that makes employer monitoring a 
cause for concern.  Rather than attempting to take an external 
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perspective of the issue, courts should focus on privacy from the 
perspective of the user because the user’s perspective is tied to 
his relationship between himself and the party monitoring his 
communications. 
IV. TWO-FACTOR APPROACH 
This Part proposes a new approach to handling the issue of 
whether privilege can be applied when a client has used an 
employer-monitored system to communicate with his attorney. 
Current tests, such as the four-factor test, vary significantly 
in their application by focusing too much on actual 
confidentiality when true privacy is extremely hard to come by on 
the Internet, and by focusing too much on employee manuals, 
which are often left unread by employees.  Variety in application 
injects undue uncertainty into the privileged status of electronic 
communications, which harms the attorney-client relationship.  
In applying the current tests, courts are implicitly taking an 
external perspective on the transaction, while ignoring the 
nature of the parties that have access to the communication.  The 
difference between an employer as an email provider and other 
parties that have access to a typical electronic communication 
lies in the relationship between the user and the provider.  
Taking an internal perspective, a user is aware of and chooses 
the provider it wants to facilitate electronic communication—this 
relationship between the user and the provider makes a right of 
access relevant. 
This Note proposes an approach that takes an internal 
perspective of the communication, through the eyes of the user, 
to determine whether the user’s subjective belief of 
confidentiality was reasonable.  This approach analyzes the 
relationship between the user and the parties with qualified 
access to monitor the communication.  The analysis starts with a 
presumption in favor of privilege—an internal perspective of an 
email user’s experience suggests that an email, whether 
facilitated by an employer or not, is a private communication, 
like dropping a sealed letter in a mailbox.  However, the nature 
of the relationship between the email user and a party 
facilitating the communication may overcome this presumption 
of privilege.  This analysis is undertaken in two parts.  First, the  
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court considers the relationship between the parties.  Second, the 
Court considers the nature of the right of access and how it is 
actually enforced by the party with access. 
At step one, the court considers the relationship between the 
user and the facilitating party with qualified access.  This 
analysis should focus on the foreseeability of a message being 
accessed for a purpose related to the subject matter of the 
message.  For example, an employee who uses employer-
monitored email to communicate with his or her lawyer about a 
lawsuit involving his or her employer would not have a strong 
claim to privilege on that communication.  This is because the 
employee can expect his or her employer to have an interest in 
monitoring employee communications related to itself.  
Conversely, an employee using such a system to communicate 
about a matter unrelated to the employer cannot foresee his or 
her employer having any interest in monitoring that message 
beyond monitoring in the ordinary course of business.  This logic 
applies to monitoring by any party.  For example, Google’s 
automated monitoring of email for advertising purposes is hardly 
inconsistent with a client’s expectation that a communication will 
remain confidential, or at least will not be revealed to a party 
that may have a legal stake in the matter.  Finally, a party, such 
as the operator of an Internet router, is not at all relevant 
because the party has little to no relationship with the user and 
the user has no way of foreseeing this party’s presence.  This 
shift in focus from true confidentiality or right of access to 
“safety,” motive to access, and foreseeability is necessary to 
protect privacy interests because some party almost always has a 
right of access to monitor Internet communications for some 
purpose.  However, most parties that monitor Internet 
communications do not do so with a purpose relating to the 
subject matter of the underlying communication being monitored.  
Therefore, clients do not, and should not, expect the monitoring 
to impact such communications. 
At step two, the court considers the nature of the right of 
qualified access with a focus on how it is actually enforced.  An 
Internet Service Provider or Internet Mailbox Provider has a 
relatively limited qualified right of access, circumscribed both by 
privacy laws and by narrow terms of service agreements.  An 
employer has a more substantial right of access, circumscribed by 
its employee monitoring policy.  The exact wording of the 
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employer’s policy deserves little attention, however, and the 
analysis should be limited to whether it is broad enough to allow 
for interception and inspection of the communication at issue.  
However, the employee’s knowledge of the policy and the 
employer’s application of that policy is far more important.  If an 
employer openly monitors communications on a regular basis, 
and regularly informs its employees, this fact would weigh 
against the application of privilege.  Conversely, if an employer 
reserves a right included in its employee handbook but never 
exercises that right, it would be unfair to say that this alone can 
prevent the application of privilege. 
CONCLUSION 
In the modern world, electronic communications are 
essential, but third parties often facilitate them.  These third 
parties may have a qualified right of access to the 
communications, such as permission to access them for business 
purposes.  Employers have among the broadest qualified rights to 
access information stored on systems they provide to their 
employees.  Since courts will not apply privilege to prevent the 
disclosure of nonconfidential communications, a framework for 
handling cases in which a third party has a qualified right of 
access for an electronic communication is needed—particularly in 
the case of an employer which monitors its employees.  In order 
to inject certainty into privilege and to avoid reliance on the art 
of drafting an employee handbook, courts should follow a two-
stepped approach.  First, the court should consider the relation of 
the parties; how foreseeable is it that the party with qualified 
access—the employer—will become an adversary or will have 
some interest in the matter discussed.  Second, the court should 
consider the nature of the qualified privilege; how broad is the 
party’s—employer’s—right to monitor the communications, how 
do they actually monitor the communications in practice, and 
how do they interpret their own policy.  With this approach, the 
policy of the attorney-client privilege is upheld, and the situation 
of a court unexpectedly refusing to apply the privilege can be 
avoided. 
